Who holds key to Bengal? The former Left and now non-committed voter

The great game that finally began yesterday in West Bengal is unlikely to end with the results on May 2. Whatever may be the outcome, the tremors of this game will be felt across the Bay of Bengal coastline for the next five years.

India’s eastern seaboard largely defied the Modi juggernaut in 2014. The state-level parties in West Bengal, Odisha, Telangana, Andhra Pradesh and Tamil Nadu managed to keep the BJP at bay for another five years. However, during the 2019 elections, the BJP breached Bengal and Odisha as the main opposition party, made serious inroads in Telangana, and waited to emerge as a serious alternative in Andhra Pradesh and Tamil Nadu. For BJP then, this election is not merely limited to a state, but building on the gains in newly acquired territories.

How did the BJP in 2019 come close to usurping the position of the Trinamool Congress (TMC) in West Bengal? The TMC’s attempt to dominate the panchayat elections in 2018, in which a large number of uncontested seats were won by the party, allegedly deploying intimidation and violent tactics irked a substantial segment of rural Bengal’s electorate. And overnight, political commentators informed us, voters committed to the Left Front’s ideology turned to the saffron party. Chup chap, kamal chhap [silently vote for lotus] became the rallying cry.

The data on vote share of various parties (graphic top right) and party identification in Lokniti-CSDS surveys indicates that the palpable surge in the favour of the BJP was in making for a long time. The Lokniti-CSDS in all its post-poll surveys asks respondents whether they or their family are a traditional supporter of any party. This question is a close proxy to what political scientists refer to as party identification. Party identifiers are voters less swayed by short-term considerations and are the mainstay on which parties mobilise and add new voters. In any election, there is a substantially large portion of the electorate which does not identify with any party, but they do vote for one party or the other. Even party identifiers too switch votes in certain conditions. Therefore, while party identification is highly correlated with vote choice, it does not follow a one-on-one relationship.

In a span of a decade, the proportion of West Bengal electorate that does not identify with any party almost doubled — from 35% in 2011 to 68% in 2019. Left Front voters didn’t turn saffron overnight; they first became non-committal, and are now ready to be mobilised by an alternative, which in Bengal’s case is another ideological extreme — the BJP.  The party identification with the Left declined from 32% to 8% in this period. Thus, not only the electoral strength of the Left Front reduced considerably, but also the dwindling of its traditional support base, created a vacuum for an alternative force to emerge. The BJP already had its eyes on the state, investing great resources in the last 5-6 years to fill in the space vacated by the Left Front.

How did this happen? Mamata Banerjee’s deep desire to decimate the Left and her attempts to appropriate the Front’s support base (Muslims and poor) though brought her short-term benefits, but also created the conditions for the BJP’s rise in Bengal. The TMC government made every effort to wean away the  Left’s base — through welfare schemes, co-opting the Left’s machine in rural Bengal and the syndicate operating in the Greater Kolkata region,  and using various identity appeals (caste, sect, region and religion) to mobilise voters. This helped the TMC to increase its vote and seat share in the last two elections. But the cracks that were appearing in the party’s social base got masked under the thumping victories of 2016 and 2018.

Mamata Banerjee was caught off guard during the 2019 election and had to put herculean efforts mid-campaign to stop the BJP juggernaut. It was the last phase in the South Bengal region in which TMC won all nine parliamentary constituencies to race past the BJP’s share in the state. In 2021, the TMC faces an uphill task as the allegation of rent-seeking among TMC’s local cadres in welfare schemes, inefficient management of Amphan cyclone relief money, and charges of violent intimidation have created a perception of severe anti-incumbency. Furthermore, the defections of prominent leaders from the Trinamool to the BJP led to an impression that the BJP has campaign momentum in its favour.

The prime minister and his party are leaving no stone unturned to win over a substantial segment of these non-committed voters. Analysis suggests that the non-identifiers are more likely to be influenced by the campaign, more likely to make a decision on whom to vote close to the polling day and are more likely to side with the perceived winner. The key question remains: does the BJP have organisational machinery to not only increase turnout among non-committal voters, but also assure them of safety and security post-verdict? If yes, then the electoral colour of India’s eastern seaboard is likely to change from hereon.

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